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We are living through a difficult time. Destabilizing tides of change, conflict, 
illness, and anxiety are sweeping across many societies. The seemingly staid, even nerdy 
world of administrative law is not immune. On the contrary, administrative law is where 
abstract policy hypotheticals are forced to engage with unavoidable “real world” 
situations. Even seemingly innocuous administrative law issues cannot help but channel 
the debates that are taking place within society. 
Social perceptions of the state and of regulation are badly polarized right now. On 
one hand, the modern administrative state is under attack. Some modern populists 
criticize the modern state for being antidemocratic, unaccountable, even tyrannical. 
Paradoxically, others criticize it for very different reasons: because it is ineffective, or 
because it binds economies and societies up in “red tape”.  
On the other hand, the need for a modern, properly-resourced, effective 
administrative state is also clearer than ever. The financial crisis taught hard lessons 
about the limits of self-regulation and the need for public sector actors to safeguard the 
public interest. We have begun to recognize the awesome and alarming size of private, 
for-profit tech companies. It is also clear that states that were capable of coordinated, 
science-driven action fared better during the 2020 global pandemic. And meanwhile, 
injustice and systemic discrimination continue on their intractable ways, as the protests 
and unrest of the summer of 2020 reminded us yet again. Reconciliation with Indigenous 
peoples in Canada, also, requires meaningful public action, including at the level of the 
administrative state. 
One thing that is clear is that the administrative state is neither the nightmare that 
its critics fear, nor the silver bullet that its strongest advocates dream of. In particular, 
when it comes to administrative law and tribunal action, there is a limit to what tribunals 
can actually accomplish, and what kinds of remedies they can order. What you want out 
of administrative law, and what you can get, may be two very different things. 
This chapter provides an overview of administrative law remedies as a whole, 
including not only the “judicial review” stage that receives so much attention, but also 
front-line tribunal remedies, internal and external appeals, enforcement mechanisms, and 
extralegal strategies. Discussing remedies near the beginning of an administrative law 
textbook may seem unconventional. We have chosen this approach because 
understanding the available remedies is an important part of understanding what one is 
getting into in administrative law. The remedies that administrative law historically 
offered have been a driver and catalyst in administrative law generally, good chunks of 
which have been reverse engineered starting from the remedies that were possible. As 
such, setting out a framework of remedies also provides a broad structural framework on 
which subsequent chapters can build. This chapter is meant to operate almost as a 
decision tree, to help guide students through the different stages where remedies issues 
arise. Figure 3.1 sets out its broad outlines. 
 
Figure 3.1  [Insert] 
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This chapter is divided into four main sections. As we shall see in Section II, 
"Remedial Options at the Tribunal Stage," the remedies that administrative agencies can 
order differ, in important and interesting ways, from the ones that courts can order. 
Administrative tribunal remedies are both more limited (because tribunals only have the 
powers and jurisdiction that their enabling statutes give them) and, potentially, more 
expansive (because of tribunals' particular expertise, their mandates, and their ability to 
remain seized of a matter over time). Section III, "Enforcing Tribunal Orders Against 
Parties," looks how a party or a tribunal can enforce a tribunal order against another 
party, either civilly or criminally. Sections IV and V consider parties' ability to challenge 
tribunal action. This includes internal appeal options and extralegal options in Section IV, 
and recourse to the courts in Section V. Recourse to the courts include appeal to the 
courts, and, finally, the classic administrative law remedy of judicial review (which, as 
discussed below, is not the same thing as appeal to the courts). This chapter’s goal is to 
give the reader a conceptual “big picture” view of administrative law, which includes the 
full range of remedies available to parties at each stage of the process. 
 
Remedial Options at the Tribunal Stage 
Administrative tribunals are as varied as the topics they deal with. It is hard to 
generalize about the remedial powers they may have, beyond two general points (both 
discussed in more detail immediately below).  
First, because a tribunal does not have the inherent jurisdiction that a court does, the 
power to impose a particular remedy must be provided for in the tribunal's enabling 
statute. Whether a tribunal can order, for example, money damages, an administrative 
penalty, or that someone lose their professional licence will depend whether its enabling 
statute gives it that power.  
Second, most tribunals' composition, structure, and mandates are different from 
courts', and their approach to remedies reflects those differences. For example, tribunals' 
experience in their fields may help them to identify systemic problems or recurring 
patterns across multiple individual disputes. Tribunals also sometimes have the ability to 
stay involved in (that is, to remain "seized" or to “have seizin” of) a dispute over a longer 
period of time. Tribunals are generally not constrained by stare decisis. Together, these 
factors sometimes allow tribunals to imagine and implement novel remedies, aimed at 
addressing the systemic problems they see.  
Statutory Authority 
As a creature of statute, without the inherent jurisdiction that courts have, a tribunal 
cannot make orders that affect individuals' rights or obligations unless its enabling statute 
empowers it to do so.1 Therefore, the first step in determining a tribunal’s remedial 
                                               
1 Att Gen of Can v Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 SCR 735, [1980] SCJ No 99 . 
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options is to read the statute. If a tribunal makes orders outside the scope of its enabling 
statute, it is exceeding its jurisdiction and those orders will be void.2 
Tribunals also lack the equitable jurisdiction that courts have. This means that they 
cannot order interim injunctions, although some enabling statutes give some tribunals the 
authority to seek a court injunction specifically to enforce that statute.  
Many enabling statutes set out express lists of the remedies a tribunal may order. For 
example, tribunals often have the power to make declaratory orders, to order a party to 
repair a problem or to mitigate damage, or to order a party to comply with a relevant 
statute. Some tribunals that have obligations to protect the public (for example, 
professional licensing bodies or securities commissions), or to manage natural resources 
(for example, fishing and forestry) also have licensing powers. Some tribunals can 
appoint conciliators and otherwise assist with settling matters.3 Some tribunals have the 
authority to impose significant fines and incarceration.4 
Some enabling statutes give their tribunals broad, discretionary power to fashion the 
remedies they see fit. We see fewer truly broad grants of discretion to tribunals than we 
did a few decades ago. Litigants have successfully invoked rule of law and certainty 
principles to question whether broad, discretionary remedial powers should be 
enforceable. Although substantial remedial discretion has become controversial, agencies 
and tribunals that have substantial policy-making jurisdiction can still maintain it. The 
“public interest” powers that provincial Securities Commissions, which allow them to 
take steps to protect markets or investors even without demonstrating a violation of law, 
are one example.5  
Even where a tribunal's remedial power is less certain (such as when its enabling 
statute does not expressly give it the authority to order a particular remedy, and it has no 
broad discretionary power), there may be room to argue that, simply as a matter of 
practical necessity, a tribunal must have the remedial power to do the things its statute 
requires it to do.6 That said, it generally takes express statutory authority for a tribunal to 
order that money be paid, for example for compensation or damages, fines, fees and 
levies, or costs.  
                                               
2 When two tribunals share jurisdiction over a particular statutory provision, a tribunal can also be found to 
exceed its jurisdiction if it deals with a claim that has already been "appropriately dealt with" by the other 
relevant tribunal. See British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, [2011] 3 
SCR 422. 
3 E.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, ss 47-48; BC Employment Standards Act, RSBC 
1996, c 113, s 78. 
4 Some tribunals’ enabling statutes provide for quasi-criminal offences which must be prosecuted by the 
Crown, not the tribunal. See e.g. BC Securities Act, RSCBC 1996, c 418, s 155. 
5 See, e.g., Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5, s 127; BC Securities Act, supra note 4, s 16; an early critique 
was Anita Anand, “Carving the Public Interest Jurisdiction in Securities Regulation: Contributions of 
Justice Iacobucci” (2007) 57 UTLJ 293. 
6 ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 SCR 140. 
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Finally, whether a tribunal has the power to grant remedies under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,7 including under s 24(1), is a separate question that 
Evan Fox-Decent and Alexander Pless address in Chapter 16.8 As well, some provinces 
have now enacted statutes that explicitly bar at least some tribunals from even 
considering Charter issues in the first place.9 
What Makes Administrative Tribunals Unique 
Administrative tribunals and agencies vary widely in their structures and functions, 
but collectively they also differ from courts in important ways. How a particular tribunal 
is designed and structured also affects the kinds of remedies it is inclined, and 
empowered, to grant.  
We focus on tribunal-type administrative action here —party-on-party dispute 
resolution, party-versus-agency enforcement, and other similar action—since they tend to 
be the most common ways in which members of the public engage with administrative 
bodies. These functions also square especially well with the concept of a "remedy," 
defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "the means of enforcing a right or preventing or 
redressing a wrong."10 
However, note that tribunal-type administrative action is only one kind of 
administrative action. Agencies' policy-making functions are also very important.11 
Through their statutory drafting choices, legislators regularly delegate detailed policy-
making decisions to administrative tribunals. Many larger administrative agencies have 
formal policy-making departments, which generally operate independent of their 
tribunals. At the new Canada Energy Regulator, for example, the Board of Directors 
provides strategic advice and direction, including based on advice from the regulator’s 
Indigenous Advisory Committee; the Chief Executive Officer manages the regulator; and 
the CER Commission operates as an arm’s length adjudicative body.12 Tribunal 
adjudicators, policy staff, government ministers and others can issue administrative 
releases, which depending on the nature of the agency can range from formal, binding 
statements to relatively informal, non-binding guidance or interpretive aids. Even 
informal policy documents matter. They are publicly available, and regulated entities are 
expected to know about them. They can directly affect the remedies that may be 
available. 
In addition to often having a policy role, many administrative agencies also have 
specialized expertise in important rights-relevant areas, such as human rights, labour law, 
                                               
7 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, RSC 1985, app II, no 44. 
8 See R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765. 
9 See, e.g., the BC Administrative Tribunals Act, 36 SBC 2004, c 45 [BC ATA], which provides that most 
provincial tribunals do not have discretion to consider constitutional or Charter questions. Sections 46.1-
46.3 of the Act impose similar restrictions on many tribunals' jurisdiction to apply the BC Human Rights 
Code to any matter before them. 
10 Black's Law Dictionary, 11th ed., sub verbo "remedy." 




immigration and refugee protection, mental health, parole, and more. Because they are 
specialists in a narrower subject matter area, these tribunals are in a better position to 
identify patterns in the matters that come before them than an all-purpose, generalist 
court would be.  
Just as importantly, administrative tribunal members are a more diverse group than 
judges are, especially in terms of their training and expertise. Many tribunal members are 
not legally trained and some tribunals' enabling statutes even require that a certain portion 
of their tribunal members be laypersons. For example, the federal Competition Tribunal 
Act13 stipulates that the tribunal shall consist of not more than six members who are 
Federal Court judges, and not more than eight other "lay" members. The statute also tells 
the Governor in Council to establish an advisory council, "to be composed of not more 
than ten members who are knowledgeable in economics, industry, commerce or public 
affairs,"14 to advise the Minister of Industry on the appointment of lay members. The 
result is a tribunal with substantial expertise in economics and in commerce. The 
tribunal's expertise also makes it more likely that its members will devise remedies that 
reflect their training and perspective, and that may be more economic than legal. 
Sometimes, tribunals are composed specifically to represent different interest groups, 
especially in areas where judges historically have been perceived as unsympathetic to 
certain parties, or not alive to some of the issues at stake. A classic example is the 
tripartite labour board, which requires a labour representative, a management 
representative, and a third party that both agree on. The BC Review Board, charged under 
the Criminal Code15 with making dispositions with respect to individuals found unfit to 
stand trial or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, also has a 
tripartite structure. The BC Mental Health Act16 requires that each panel of the Review 
Board consist of a doctor, a lawyer, and a person who is neither a doctor nor a lawyer.17 
The kinds of remedies that such boards devise are likely to reflect the priorities and 
assumptions of its members. They may not be limited to the strictly legal remedies that 
spring most easily to the legally-trained mind. 
For all these reasons, even when acting in their tribunal capacity, administrative 
tribunals often do (and many believe that they should) take a broader perspective on a 
dispute than courts necessarily would. One way to understand the difference is in terms 
described by an American scholar, Abram Chayes, in the mid-1970s.18 Chayes talked 
about courts, not administrative agencies. Nevertheless, his point illuminates the 
distinction between the two.  
Chayes described a dichotomy between traditional conceptions of adjudication, and 
an emerging judicial role in what he described as “public law litigation”. In traditional 
adjudication, a suit involves only the private parties before the court. It is self-contained 
                                               
13 Competition Tribunal Act, RSCR 1985, c 19 (2d Supp), s 3(2). 
14 Ibid, s 3(3). 
15 RSC, 1985, c C-46. 
16 RSBC 1996, c 288. 
17 RSBC 1996, c 288, s 24.1(3). 
18 Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv L Rev 1281; see also 
DM Gordon, "'Administrative' Tribunals and the Courts" (1933) 49 LQ Rev 94. 
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and party-initiated. A dispassionate judge identifies the private right at issue, based on 
doctrinal analysis and retrospective factual inquiry. The judge imposes relief, understood 
as compensation for the past violation of an identifiable existing right. By contrast, in 
public law litigation, Chayes argued that the suit is connected to the vindication of 
broader statutory or constitutional policies. The lawsuit is not self-contained. The judge 
must manage complex trial situations involving not only the parties to the dispute, but 
also the many and shifting stakeholders not before the court, who nevertheless may be 
affected by its outcome. Factual inquiry is predictive (“how can this ruling improve the 
situation going forward?”) not retrospective (“how can we fairly put this particular 
dispute behind us?”). Through a combination of party negotiation and continuing judicial 
involvement, the judge fashions relief that is ad hoc, ongoing, and prospective. For 
Chayes, judges can become change agents under whose direction specific cases can have 
far-reaching effects. 
Compared to courts, tribunals often have different kinds of expertise, more direct 
connections to policy decisions in their area, and the experience to see broader patterns 
within their specific field. This means that in the right circumstances, administrative 
tribunals, like public interest litigation for Chayes, can be change agents too.19 Tribunals 
that are responsible for trying to address the broader patterns they see are also probably 
more entitled than courts to remaining seized of a case over a longer period of time.20 All 
of this means that administrative tribunals may be justified in trying to develop remedies 
that address underlying structural or systemic problems in a forward-looking way. 
As we have read in the Introduction to this Volume and as described more fully by 
Paul Daly in Chapter 12, a majority of the Supreme Court in Vavilov has stepped back 
from the idea that administrative tribunals’ particular and unique expertise should be 
central to determining standard of review. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that: 
Administrative decision makers cannot always be expected to deploy the 
same array of legal techniques that might be expected of a lawyer or judge 
— nor will it always be necessary or even useful for them to do so. … 
“Administrative justice” will not always look like “judicial justice”…21 
Ideologically, this is an important and consequential point. How we understand 
tribunal expertise affects how we interpret their powers, the remedies they can order, and 
the respect courts give to them. If courts recognize that tribunals are different from courts 
in meaningful ways, and that they are entitled to make decisions that look different from 
judicial decisions, then courts have a good substantive reason, in addition to legislative 
intent, to demonstrate respect for tribunals’ own remedial decisions.22 If courts do not 
                                               
19 For an interesting contemporary take, see Margaret Doyle and Nick O’Brien, Reimagining 
Administrative Justice: Human Rights in Small Places (Cham, CH: Palgrave, 2020) esp. at pp. 117-21; 123-
24; 131-38. 
20 See e.g. Hughes v. Elections Canada, 2010 CHRT 4 at paras 64-78; First Nations Child & Family 
Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (Minister of Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada), 2018 CHRT 4 at paras 21-54. 
21 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at para 92. 
22 See also CMRRA-SODRAC Inc v Apple Canada, 2020 FCA 101 at para 49. 
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recognize that tribunals’ unique characteristics are significant and valuable, then courts 
have less reason to defer.  
In particular, how courts think about tribunals’ unique memberships and their 
remedial powers directly affects the viability of tribunal orders for systemic remedies, 
aimed at addressing patterns of discrimination. Systemic remedies – in which tribunals 
order ongoing and broader remedies including, such as training, special programs, or 
monitoring, in order to address pervasive structural or ethical problems – are 
controversial, and tribunals do not order them often. But while these kinds of orders are 
relatively rare, there is arguably a need for these kind of remedial orders to address, for 
example, structural patterns of discrimination, including those based on Indigeneity and 
race, are still deeply embedded in Canadian society. Potentially, one of the most 
important strategies we may have for dislodging them will be through administrative 
action.  
The section below discusses three cases in which human rights tribunals have 
imposed systemic remedies. The fact that these tribunal-ordered remedies look different 
from what courts might have ordered highlights why, in order to understand 
administrative law, we need to understand much more than just judicial review. 
Systemic Remedies at the Tribunal Level  
Unlike most other tribunals, many human rights tribunals have the authority, under 
their enabling statutes, to impose remedies geared toward addressing systemic 
problems.23 One effort at creating a structure- and system-oriented process took place 
within Ontario's Ministry of Correctional Services, as a response to a longstanding human 
rights complaint by an employee of the Ministry. 
The complainant in that case, Michael McKinnon, was a correctional officer of 
Indigenous ancestry. In 1998, ten years after Mr. McKinnon’s complaint was initiated, 
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (then called the Board of Inquiry) found that Mr. 
McKinnon suffered discrimination and harassment at his workplace, the Toronto East 
Detention Centre, because of his race, ancestry, and ethnic origin. In response, the 
tribunal ordered a number of systemic remedies to address the "poisoned atmosphere" at 
the facility, Toronto East, and within Corrections generally. Among other things, the 
tribunal ordered that certain individual respondents be relocated, that the tribunal's order 
be publicized among Corrections employees, and that a human rights training program be 
established. The tribunal reconvened the hearing in 2002 because Mr. McKinnon asserted 
that the poisoned work environment had not improved. The issue for the tribunal at that 
point was not whether the existing systemic remedies had been implemented, strictly 
speaking, but whether they had been carried out in good faith. 
After dealing with the question whether it could remain seized of the matter—finding 
that it could, as affirmed later by the Ontario Court of Appeal24—the tribunal ordered 
additional remedies, including training for Ministry and Facility management; 
establishing a roster of external mediators to deal with discrimination complaints; and 
                                               
23 See, e.g., Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 53(2)(a); Ontario Human Rights Code, RSO 
1990, c H.19, ss. 45.3(1), (2); BC Human Rights Code, RSBC	1996,	c	210, s 37(2)(c)(ii). 
24 Ontario v McKinnon, [2004] OJ No 5051 .  
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appointing an independent third-party consultant to develop and oversee the training 
programs. The third-party consultant was to be nominated by the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission (OHRC), to be paid for by the Ministry, and to report to the tribunal.  
What makes these remedies interesting is that they are so different in character from 
traditional legal remedies, such as damages (in the civil context) or quashing of Ministry 
or Facility decisions (in the administrative law context). This looks like Chayes's public 
law litigation model: these remedies are prospective, open-ended, and subject to ongoing 
revision and elaboration. The tribunal's remedial orders—the emphasis on training, and 
bringing in the expertise of external human rights consultants to work with the Ministry 
in developing that training—seem geared less toward redressing the wrongs against Mr. 
McKinnon in particular, and more toward effecting wide-ranging, permanent, systemic 
change to institutional culture. 
In 2005, the parties were still arguing over the scope of the third-party consultant's 
responsibilities.25 By 2007, the tribunal found that the Ministry had not been 
implementing the tribunal's previous orders in good faith.26 Remarkably, in 2011, the 
tribunal exercised its discretion to state a prima facie case for contempt to the Ontario 
Divisional Court, against the Deputy Minister, for failing to implement its earlier 
orders.27 (As we see below, this is a tribunal’s last resort in trying to get its orders 
followed.) 
Before that case could be heard, however, and after 23 years of litigation, Michael 
McKinnon and the Ministry finally reached a settlement. Mr. McKinnon’s personal case 
was done, the tribunal wrapped up its work, and the project entered a new phase. Under 
the August 2011 settlement agreement, the OHRC, the Ministry of Community Safety 
and Correctional Services, and the Ministry of Government Services all signed on to a 
three-year Human Rights Project, which established mechanisms targeting accountability, 
operations, learning, and complaint management within Correctional Services.28 They 
made some progress, even while “organizational culture” remained a barrier to effecting 
“long-term, systemic, or broad-based human rights improvements.”29 In 2014, the 
agreement’s final year, the parties formulated another multi-year human rights action 
plan aimed at addressing discrimination and harassment within Correctional Services, 
                                               
25 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Interim Decisions and Rulings, Ontario Human Rights Commission 
and Michael McKinnon and Ontario Ministry of Correctional Services, 2005 HRTO 15 (19 May 2005), 
online: [lt]http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onhrt/doc/2005/2005hrto15/2005hrto15.html[gt]. 
26 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), 2007 HRTO 4. 
27 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), 2011 HRTO 263. 
28 “Organizational change in Correctional Services—the MCSCS Human Rights Project Charter” 
[lt]http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/annual-report-2012-2013-rights-partners-actions/organizational-change-
correctional-services-%E2%80%93-mcscs-human-rights-project-charter[gt]; “Correctional Services: update 
on the MCSCS Human Rights Project Charter” 
[lt]http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/annual-report-2011-2012-human-rights-next-generation/correctional-services-
update-mcscs-human-rights-project-charter[gt]. 
29 “Organizational change in Correctional Services—the MCSCS Human Rights Project Charter”, ibid.  
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with a special focus on the needs and concerns of Indigenous Peoples.30 The plan is 
scheduled to conclude in August 2021. 
The McKinnon settlement and the efforts that follow it are cause for some optimism, 
but genuine reform at the systemic level was never, and is still not, a foregone 
conclusion. The 2011 settlement might never have happened if a new Deputy Minister of 
Corrections had not been appointed with a mandate to professionalize the service and 
improve its record.31 Nor is a 23-year-long litigation matter ever really a victory, no 
matter how it ends. Thus, McKinnon raised and still leaves us with some challenging 
questions: was it acceptable that Mr. McKinnon bore the burden of trying to force change 
for so many years? Did we really have to get to the point where a tribunal was willing to 
bring a contempt case against a Deputy Minister? Can human rights tribunals or other 
administrative actors ever effect real, substantive "good faith" compliance in a truly 
recalcitrant employer? Is it appropriate to use law to simultaneously enforce rights, 
redress wrongs, and "cure" systemic problems? Is it appropriate for a tribunal to continue 
crafting new orders in an effort to achieve better systemic outcomes? Can external third 
parties, like the various consultants involved in this matter over the years, really change 
culture and create meaningful dialogue? If not, what legal options do we have left—
through tribunal remedies or otherwise? 
The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has been dealing with another important string 
of systemic discrimination cases since 2007: the Caring Society cases, concerning the 
ongoing underfunding of the on-reserve child welfare system. The complainants in these 
cases argue that because on-reserve child welfare is underfunded, Indigenous children are 
removed from their families in disproportionately and unacceptably high numbers. After 
the tribunal found on a prima facie basis that Canada had systemically discriminated 
against on-reserve children and families by denying them equal child and family 
services,32 the battle pivoted to the question of what remedies the tribunal had the 
authority to order, and how to implement them. As in McKinnon, these questions have 
been the subject of multiple long judgments and several judicial review applications in 
the years since.33 In some ways, the Caring Society cases are simpler than McKinnon 
was, because the discrimination is about funding for services and compensation for harm, 
not about changing organizational culture. All the same, the tribunal has not yet issued a 
final compensation order because of ongoing challenges around compensation models, 
funding principles, and the scope of the tribunal’s remedial authority. Some of these 
challenges seem to be the product of stalling on Canada’s part; others stem from 
                                               
30 “Reaching new milestones with the Human Rights Project Charter” [lt] 
https://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/Policiesandguidelines/CorrectionsHumanRightsPlan
Qsand.html[gt]. 
31 The Toronto East Detention Centre is not the only Ontario facility at which correctional officers have 
alleged that they suffer discrimination and harassment based on their race or ancestry. See, e.g. Cox v 
Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2014 HRTO 286, an ongoing matter involving an 
alleged hate mail campaign directed at African-Canadian corrections officers at the Toronto Jail going back 
to 2004. 
32 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the 
Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2. 
33 For discussion, see Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Frances Kelly, “The Authority of Human Rights 
Tribunals to Grant Systemic Remedies” (2017) 6:1 Can J Hum Rts 1. 
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genuinely difficult questions about how, essentially, to design a just, effective, and 
culturally safe process for compensating those that have been and continue to be harmed.  
Note that courts are not always very comfortable with tribunals ordering broad 
remedies that aim to address systemic problems. From a rule of law perspective, while it 
is important that courts be able to judicially review tribunals’ decisions, both the prospect 
and fact of judicial review also introduce some difficult tensions. When courts engage 
with systemic issues they run quickly into public policy choices, separation of powers 
concerns, and legitimacy concerns. Tribunals, too, may quickly run into the limits of their 
statutory authority. This is as it should be. And yet, for these reasons, judicial review may 
always serve as a brake on tribunals’ more ambitious efforts to effect systemic change. 
For example, Moore v British Columbia (Education)34 is a case representing the final 
step in a judicial review of the BC Human Rights Tribunal’s decision that in failing to 
provide educational support, both the province and the North Vancouver School District 
had discriminated against Jeffrey Moore, a child with dyslexia. In making its decision, 
the tribunal addressed not only the impact on Jeffrey and his family (his parents sent him 
to an expensive private school for children with language-based learning disabilities), but 
also the fact that the BC Ministry of Education had implemented a fixed cap on special 
education funding, which was below what it would have cost to address the actual 
numbers of special needs students in the province. The tribunal also considered the 
School District’s decision to close its Diagnostic Centre without providing an adequate 
substitute. The District had closed the Centre, which provided support to dyslexic 
students, in response to the Ministry’s funding constraints while leaving other 
discretionary programs, like a popular “Outdoor School” program, intact. The tribunal 
ordered damages to Jeffrey’s family. It also ordered that the Province allocate funding 
based on actual incidence levels of special needs; that both the Province and the District 
establish mechanisms to ensure that students with severe learning disabilities are taken 
care of in public schools; and that the tribunal remain seized of the matter to oversee the 
implementation of its remedial orders.  
At the Supreme Court of Canada, writing for a unanimous court, Abella J upheld the 
Human Rights Tribunal’s findings of discrimination against Jeffrey by the District, and 
the personal damages it awarded. However, the tribunal’s systemic remedies were held to 
be too remote from the scope of the complaint.35 They were “quashed,” or invalidated. 
The court observed that a remedy afforded by the tribunal to an individual claimant could 
still have a systemic impact, but that 
The remedy must flow from the claim. In this case, the claim was made on 
behalf of Jeffrey, and the evidence giving concrete support to the claim all 
centred on him. While the Tribunal was certainly entitled to consider 
systemic evidence in order to determine whether Jeffrey had suffered 
discrimination, it was unnecessary for it to hold an extensive inquiry into 
the precise format of the provincial funding mechanism or the entire 
                                               
34 Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 SCR 360 [Moore].  
35 Ibid. at para 57. The relevant standard of review was patent unreasonableness, which exists in British 
Columbia under the BC ATA, supra note 9. [Production Editor: Please check all supra references.] 
 
 12 
provincial administration of special education in order to determine 
whether Jeffrey was discriminated against. The Tribunal, with great 
respect, is an adjudicator of the particular claim that is before it, not a 
Royal Commission.36 
 Abella J also set aside the tribunal’s remedial orders against the Ministry on the 
basis that the connection between province-wide fixed cap funding and closure of the 
Diagnostic Centre was too remote. Moreover, Abella J found no need for the tribunal to 
remain seized “on behalf of an individual student who has finished his high school 
education and will not re-enter the public school system.”37 Some human rights tribunals 
have distinguished Moore based on the way it was pleaded.38 Certainly, the sharp contrast 
in Moore between the tribunal’s conception of its mandate, which was broadly consistent 
with the McKinnon tribunal’s approach, and the Supreme Court’s retrospective, party-
focused analysis underscores the boundaries that courts can impose around tribunal-
ordered systemic remedies. 
 
Enforcing Tribunal Orders Against Parties 
After a tribunal makes a decision and imposes an order, another set of administrative 
law remedies becomes available: the enforcement powers. These may be invoked where a 
tribunal needs to enforce its order against a party that is not complying with the order. 
This is not uncommon among self-regulatory organizations, such as professional 
licensing bodies, where the tribunal acts against particular individuals rather than 
adjudicating disputes between parties. Alternatively, a party to a dispute before a tribunal 
may want to enforce the tribunal's order against another party on which the order was 
imposed. Of course, regardless of any broader social patterns or systemic factors 
operating, tribunal orders can only be enforced against the parties on which they are 
imposed. 
The Tribunal Seeks to Enforce Its Order 
Rarely, a tribunal may enforce its own orders. One tribunal that has the power to 
enforce its own orders—for example, an order for civil contempt—is the federal 
Competition Tribunal.39 Some other tribunals are also given the authority to enforce 
monetary obligations, such as requiring unpaid wages or family maintenance to be paid, 
imposing liens, making garnishment orders, seizing assets, or even suspending driving 
privileges.40 However, a tribunal only has the enforcement powers that its enabling 
statute gives it, and those enforcement powers must be in keeping with the constitution. 
                                               
36 Supra note 34 at para 64 (emphasis added). 
37 Ibid at para 66. 
38 See, e.g., Desmarais v Correctional Service of Canada, 2014 CHRT 5. 
39 Competition Tribunal Act, supra note 13, s 8(2). See Chrysler Canada Ltd v Canada (Competition 
Tribunal), [1992] 2 SCR 394 (4th) [Chrysler Canada]; also Lymer v Jonsson, 2016 ABCA 76 at paras 11-
13. 
40 E.g. Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, ss 87-101; Maintenance Enforcement Act, SNS 
1994-95, c 6, ss 19, 27-30. 
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For example, a provincially-created tribunal cannot have criminal (and therefore federal) 
enforcement powers.41 
In British Columbia, certain sections of the Administrative Tribunals Act42 are 
intended to help tribunals obtain compliance with their orders. For example, s 18 permits 
certain tribunals to schedule a hearing, make a decision, or dismiss an application if a 
party fails to comply with an order (presumably, an order to appear). Section 31(1)(e) 
permits some tribunals to dismiss an application if the applicant fails to comply with a 
tribunal order. Section 47, which permits some tribunals to make orders for payment of 
costs, also allows some tribunals, under s 47(1)(c), to require a party to pay the tribunal's 
actual costs "if the tribunal considers the conduct of a party has been improper, vexatious, 
frivolous or abusive." Orders for costs, on being filed in the court registry, have the same 
effect as a court order for the recovery of a debt (s 47(2)). 
Outside these situations, tribunals must generally apply to the courts to have their 
orders enforced. For example, the omnibus Statutory Powers Procedure Act in Ontario 
allows tribunals to state a case for contempt to the Ontario Divisional Court, as happened 
in the McKinnon case in 2011. Where a party has disobeyed a tribunal order, the statute 
also provides that the tribunal may apply to court for a compliance order .43 The tribunal's 
order is presumed to be valid and correct, unless the party disobeying the tribunal’s order 
filed and won an appeal from the order (if one is available).44 Other statutes allow 
tribunal orders to be registered with the court, sometimes only with leave.45 In Quebec, a 
distinct procedure known as homologation gives courts the authority to compel 
individuals to fulfill tribunal orders.46  
Once a tribunal has successfully converted its order into a court order through one of 
the mechanisms above, the order can be enforced like any other court order. Among other 
things, the court can initiate contempt proceedings if the party continues to disregard the 
order.47 Contempt proceedings may be available to enforce a tribunal's procedural order 
(for example, failing to appear as a witness or to produce documents) or a tribunal's final 
substantive order.48 Contempt can be civil or, where the conduct constitutes an intentional 
public act of defiance of the court, criminal.49 In a contempt proceeding, the judge does 
not inquire into whether the tribunal's underlying order is valid. However, the order must 
                                               
41 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725, [1996] 2 WWR 1; United Nurses of Alberta v 
Alberta (Attorney General), [1992] 1 SCR 901, 89 DLR (4th) 609. 
42 BC ATA, supra note 9. 
43 See e.g. Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c S 22, ss 13 and 19, respectively. 
44 Estevan Coal Corp v Estevan (Rural Municipality No 5), [2000] 8 WWR 474. 
45 See e.g. BC ATA, supra note 9, ss 47, 54. 
46 See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c C-25.01, s 72. 
47 Tribunals may have the power to make orders for in facie contempt (contempt "in the face of" the court 
during the proceedings) if their enabling statute designates them as a “court of record,” meaning they have 
the powers of a statutorily created court. If a tribunal is not designated as a court of record, then its enabling 
statute would have to explicitly give it the power to punish for in facie contempt, like the power to punish 
for ex facie contempt (contempt outside the proceedings). Chrysler Canada, supra note 39. 
48 See e.g. Statutory Powers Procedure Act, supra note 43, s 13. 
49 Carey v Laiken, 2015 SCC 17 at paras 31-32. 
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be clear and unambiguous, the party must have known about it, and the party must have 
intentionally violated it.50 A court can also refuse to hold a party in contempt until an 
appeal or judicial review application (discussed below) is completed, although parties can 
be required to pay money into court in the meantime.51 
A Party Seeks to Enforce a Tribunal's Order 
Very rarely, a party that has succeeded before a tribunal may also be able to bring its 
own action against another party, in court, to enforce an administrative order. For 
example, a group of teachers successfully enforced an arbitrator's order that a school 
board annually set aside certain funds for teachers' professional development.52 Sara 
Blake has suggested that the party's success "may depend on whether the tribunal order is 
of a type that a court would enforce, and whether the court believes it should enforce the 
tribunal order in the absence of any statutory procedure for obtaining court assistance."53 
In other words, courts may be more likely to grant a private application to enforce a 
tribunal order where the court recognizes the tribunal's order as similar to the kind of 
order that a court might make. However, the private applicant will first have the difficult 
task of convincing the court that it should intervene in this way, even though there may 
be no statutory provision explicitly empowering it to do so.  
Criminal Prosecution 
Many statutes provide that persons who disobey tribunal orders may be prosecuted 
quasi-criminally. Quasi-criminal offences are prosecuted by the federal or provincial 
Crown, as appropriate, and they carry penalties that include fines and imprisonment. For 
example, a person who commits an offence under s 155 of the BC Securities Act54 is 
liable to a fine of not more than $5 million, to imprisonment for not more than five years, 
or both. Indictable offences under the federal Fisheries Act may attract fines of up to 
$500,000 or imprisonment for up two years, or both.55 
In the absence of other provisions, and in particular where the tribunal’s enabling 
statute does not expressly provide for any other penalty, it is an offence punishable on 
summary conviction to disobey a federal or provincial tribunal’s lawful order, other than 
an order for the payment of money.56 
 
                                               
50 Ibid. at paras 33-35.  
51 Boucher v Logistik Unicorp Inc, [2001] JQ No 64 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2001] CSCR 
No 115; Sodema Inc v Sarafian, 2006 QCCA 816, [2006] JQ No 5460 . 
52 Melia v Moose Jaw Roman Catholic Separate School District No 22 (1979), 108 DLR (3d) 113, [1979] 
SJ No 568  (CA). 
53 Sara Blake, Administrative Law in Canada, 6th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2017) at 
¶9.25. 
54 Supra note 4. 
55 Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14, s 78(b). 
56 Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 127(1) (emphasis added); see also R v Gibbons, 2012 
SCC 28, [2012] 2 SCR 92, United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General), supra note 41. 
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Challenging Administrative Action Without Going to Court 
A party that is unhappy with how an administrative proceeding is going may also 
decide to challenge that administrative proceeding. For example, a party could challenge 
the tribunal's jurisdiction, its procedure, its impartiality, or the substance of its final 
decision. Each of these usually amounts to a direct or indirect challenge to the remedies 
or orders the tribunal imposes. Sometimes, these challenges are made through 
applications for what in administrative law is called “judicial review.” However, 
applications for judicial review, like litigation generally, can be expensive and drawn-out. 
It is also important to be realistic about what judicial review can accomplish. It may not 
get you what you want. For example, a motion to quash a tribunal decision, if successful, 
will often only lead to the court sending the matter back to the original tribunal for 
rehearing.57 There is no guarantee that the party will get the substantive outcome they 
want the second time around. 
Parties that want to challenge administrative action should therefore consider their 
options carefully. There may be non-court options for getting a desired result more easily, 
more quickly, and more cheaply. Most people who appear before tribunals now are 
unrepresented by counsel; the same is true in the courts. Putting people first, whether they 
are represented or not, means working to find the most effective way to achieve a desired 
result. Some ways to challenge a tribunal decision are internal to the administrative 
apparatus itself, and others are outside both the administrative agency and courts.   
Internal Tribunal Mechanisms 
A party that wants to challenge a tribunal action will need to understand the tribunal's 
structure and capacity, as set out in its enabling statute. All tribunals can fix certain 
things, such as clerical errors or factual errors due to mistake or dishonesty, without 
express statutory authority. This is sometimes called the "slip rule."58 Tribunals can also 
"change their minds" until the time a final decision is made. Therefore, it is important to 
work out what constitutes a "final decision". For example, if a statute provides that final 
decisions must be in writing, then only written decisions will constitute final decisions. 
Preliminary rulings can also be changed until the final decision on a matter has been 
made.59 
Some enabling statutes specifically give tribunals the ability to reconsider and rehear 
decisions they have made. This is most common where a particular tribunal has ongoing 
regulatory responsibility over a particular domain, such as public utilities regulation or 
employer–employee relations. For example, the Public Service Labour Relations Act 
provides that, subject to some conditions, “the Board may review, rescind or amend any 
of its orders or decisions, or may rehear any application before making an order in respect 
                                               
57 See Kate Glover, Chapter XX. 
58 See e.g. Chandler v Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2 SCR 848 at 861 [Chandler]; Muscillo 
Transport Ltd v Ontario (Licence Suspension Appeal Board) (1997), 149 DLR (4th) 545 at 553 (ONSC), 
aff'd [1998] OJ No 1488  (CA). 
59 Comeau's Sea Foods Limited v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [1997] 1 SCR 12. 
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of the application."60 Without this kind of express statutory authority, however, a tribunal 
cannot reconsider or alter a final decision made within its jurisdiction. Finality is 
important too. Once it has made its final decision, the tribunal is functus officio.61 
As a next-best alternative for challenging a tribunal decision, consider that some 
administrative tribunals are part of multi-level administrative agencies. Those tribunals' 
enabling statutes may provide for internal appeals, within the administrative agency 
itself. For example, parties appearing before Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board 
Immigration Division may appeal to its Immigration Appeal Division.62 Similarly, 
provincial securities acts across the country provide that persons directly affected by 
decisions made by Securities Commission staff may appeal to (or, in some statutes, seek 
"review" from) the overarching commission itself, to which staff report.63 Again, parties 
should be aware that internal appellate structures may not look much like courts. 
A party that is unhappy with the outcome of these kinds of internal review 
proceedings could still seek further review from the courts, as discussed below in Section 
V. However, a challenger will generally be expected to exhaust all its internal avenues, 
such as internal appeals within a multilevel agency, first. 
External Non-Court Mechanisms 
As heralded earlier, a party considering a challenge to administrative action should 
also not overlook non-legal avenues. For example, ombudspersons or similar positions 
exist by statute in every Canadian province. There is no overarching federal 
ombudsperson, but some federal departments and subject areas have their own 
specialized ombudspersons. Generally, the mandate of an ombudsperson is to provide a 
forum for citizens to bring their complaints regarding the way that government 
departments and agencies have dealt with them. There is no charge to make a complaint 
to an ombudsperson. Ombudspersons have discretion as to whether or not they will 
investigate a complaint. 
There is some limit to how much an ombudsperson can assert jurisdiction over 
administrative tribunal decisions and processes (as opposed to government departments 
and ministries). Most legislation defines the ombudsperson's jurisdiction as being over 
"matters of administration," and courts have tended to define "administration" 
expansively to include generic administrative processes.64 However, most ombuds 
statutes provide that an ombudsperson can only investigate a tribunal's decision after any 
                                               
60 Public Service Labour Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22, s 43. 
61 Chandler, supra note 58. 
62 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 62-71. See also Paul Daly, “Les appels 
administratifs au Canada” (2015) 93 Can Bar Rev 71. 
63 See e.g. Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S 5, s 8(2); Alberta Securities Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 
35(1); BC Securities Act, supra note 8, ss 165(3), 167(1). 
64 British Columbia Development Corporation v Friedmann (Ombudsman), [1984] 2 SCR 447; 
Ombudsman of Ontario v Ontario (Labour Relations Board) (1986), 44 DLR (4th) 312 (Ont CA); Alberta 
(Ombudsman) v Alberta (Human Rights and Citizenship Commission), 2008 ABQB 168. 
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right of appeal or review on the merits has been exercised, or after the time limit for 
doing so has expired.65 
Several other public officials similar to ombudspersons also exist, including freedom 
of information and privacy commissioners, the auditor general, and provincial auditors. 
 
Going to Court  
Finally, there are the courts. The ability to challenge administrative action in the 
courts is a mixed, but necessary, blessing. On the downside, even leaving aside some 
very serious concerns about costs and access to justice, courts may be reluctant to 
embrace novel, non-courtlike, yet potentially effective remedies devised by specialized 
tribunals. The richness and creativity that may characterize administrative law remedies 
could be stifled by potentially over-judicialized, overly interventionist court scrutiny. 
This is one reason why internal appeal mechanisms, which permit decisions to be 
reviewed by higher-level bodies within the administrative agency structure itself, make 
sense. On the other hand, there are times, such as during national emergencies, when 
executive action unquestionably needs to be subject to the rule of law, as applied by 
independent courts.66 As with so many things in administrative law, context matters. 
There may be times when it makes sense to maintain the integrity of the administrative 
regime through all internal appeal stages. There may also be times when what is needed 
is faster and unapologetic recourse to the courts—for example, allowing a party to 
"leapfrog" the internal appeals and proceed directly to judicial review. 
There are two main ways by which a party to a tribunal action can access the courts to 
challenge that action: appeal and judicial review. Appeal mechanisms—either to internal 
administrative appellate bodies or to courts—only exist where the statutory scheme 
provides for them. As well, the scope of a possible appeal is confined to what the statute 
expressly provides. By contrast, judicial review is an exceptional remedy that goes 
beyond what the statute provides for.67 Significantly, judicial review is also discretionary. 
Judicial review doctrine is the product of decades of contentious court battles, modified 
from time to time by statute, directly pitting "legal" values of justice and the rule of law 
against "democratic" values and legislative intent, as well as "bureaucratic" values such 
as efficiency and expertise. Even the seemingly basic questions of whether judicial 
review is available in a particular situation, and what remedies are available, have been 
shaped by these contests. 
Regardless of whether a party exercises a statutory right of appeal, where available, 
or seeks judicial review, that court decision can be appealed further up the judicial 
hierarchy in keeping with those courts’ appeal provisions. 
                                               
65 See e.g. the Yukon Ombudsman Act, RSY 2002, c 163, s 12; but see the Manitoba Ombudsman Act, 
CCSM c O45, s 18(d) and the Saskatchewan Ombudsman Act, 2012, SS 2012, c O-3.2, s 18(2), which give 
the ombuds some discretion to intervene. 
66 See Chapter 3, Everything You Ever Needed to Know: The Canadian Rule of Law. The national security 
context is also treated differently: consider Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 
44 [Khadr]. 
67 David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 462.  
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Statutory Rights of Appeal to the Courts 
Not all tribunals are subject to statutory appeals. As well, not all statutory rights of 
appeal are created equal. Below are the five major questions a party must ask to 
determine whether and what kind of appeal is available to them, from a tribunal to the 
courts. 
Does the Tribunal's Enabling Statute Provide for a Right of Appeal? 
This is a yes/no question. Courts have no inherent jurisdiction to take appeals from 
administrative tribunals.68 If a tribunal's enabling statute provides for a right to appeal 
from the tribunal to a court, a statutory right of appeal exists. If there is no right of appeal 
in the statute, there is no right of appeal. A party that is unhappy with a tribunal decision 
would still be able to access the courts via judicial review, which is an exceptional 
remedy. It is described below.  
Even where a tribunal’s enabling statute provides for a statutory right of appeal, 
parties may not generally appeal interlocutory rulings (for example, on jurisdiction, 
procedural or evidentiary issues, or bias).69 To be appealable, the tribunal's decision must 
decide the merits of the matter or otherwise be a final disposition of it.70 
Usually, a tribunal's enabling statute will also set out the court to which tribunal 
orders may be appealed. For federal tribunals, appeals are usually taken to the Federal 
Court or the Federal Court of Appeal.71 Appeals from provincially constituted tribunals 
may be taken, depending on what the enabling statute says, to the province's trial court of 
general jurisdiction,72 to a divisional court,73 or to a court of appeal.74 Rarely, a statute 
will provide a right (seldom exercised) to appeal a tribunal decision to Cabinet itself.75 
What Is the Scope of Available Appeal? 
Just as the enabling statute determines whether a statutory appeal is available in the 
first place, the enabling statute completely determines its scope. That scope varies from 
tribunal to tribunal. Unlike the question of whether a statutory right of appeal exists, the 
                                               
68 Re Medora, 1982 CanLII 4089 (NB CA), cited with approval in Chalmers v Toronto Stock Exchange, 
1989 CanLII 4122 (ON CA), leave to appeal to SCC denied: February 22, 1990. S.C.C. File No. 21710. 
S.C.C. Bulletin, 1990, p. 407. 
69 Mary & David Goodine Dairy Farm v New Brunswick (Milk Marketing Board), 2002 NBCA 38, 217 
DLR (4th) 708, [2002] NBJ No 177; Roosma v Ford Motor Co of Canada Ltd (1988), 66 OR (2d) 18 (Div 
Ct); Newfoundland Transport Ltd v Newfoundland (Public Utilities Board), [1983] NJ No 92, 45 Nfld & 
PEIR 76 at 78 (CA); contra, Fox v Registered Nurses' Assn, 2002 NSCA 106, 207 NSR (2d) 330. 
70 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Ontario Teachers' Federation, 19 OR (3d) 371, [1994] OJ No 
1585  (Gen Div); Prince Albert (City) v Riocan Holding Inc, 2004 SKCA 73, 241 DLR (4th) 308 (CA). 
71 Respectively, see e.g. Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13, s 56; and Competition Tribunal Act, supra 
note 13, s 13. 
72 See e.g. Nunavut’s Tourism Act, RSNWT 1988, c T-7, s 8.1. 
73 See e.g. Ontario’s Expropriations Act, RSO 1990, c E26, s 31. 
74 See e.g. BC Securities Act, supra note 4, s 167(1).  
75 See e.g. Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c 11, s 28. 
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question of the scope of the appeal is not a yes/no question. To determine scope, one 
must read the relevant provisions in the tribunal’s enabling statute. 
For example, some statutes permit complete de novo review of a tribunal's decision, 
while others will be limited to issues of law based entirely on the record. Several enabling 
statutes provide for a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision-maker 
only on questions of law or jurisdiction.76 The enabling statute may also allow only 
certain parties to bring an appeal. In other words, the scope of a court's jurisdiction in an 
appeal from a tribunal decision may be different from the scope of an appellate court's 
jurisdiction in an appeal from a lower court decision. Where the scope of a statutory 
appeal is limited, parties still have the option of bringing a judicial review application on 
aspects of the tribunal decision where the appeal mechanism does not apply.77 
What is the Standard of Review that a Court Should Apply on a Statutory Appeal?  
Standard of review is covered in depth in other chapters. For now it is enough to 
know that since Vavilov, the default standard of review for a statutory right of appeal is 
presumed to be the same for courts reviewing tribunal decisions as it is for appellate 
courts reviewing trial court decisions. That is, in reviewing extricable questions of law, 
the court would assess the tribunal decision on the standard of correctness, just as it 
would for a trial court. If there is an error of law, the tribunal’s decision will be overruled. 
On questions of fact, the standard of review would be palpable and overriding error, just 
as it is for a trial court. But these are just defaults. Since these are statutory appeals, the 
legislature could also choose to specify a particular standard of review on the appeal, and 
in that case what the statute says would prevail.78 
Is an Appeal Available as of Right, or Is Leave Required? If Leave Is Required, Who May 
Grant It? 
The statute may provide that appeals are as of right, or the statute may require leave 
(i.e., permission to appeal). Where leave is required, it may be the leave either of the 
original decision-maker or, more frequently, of the appellate body (that is, the court). For 
example, British Columbia's Forest and Range Practices Act provides for an appeal as of 
right from the Forest Appeals Commission to the BC Supreme Court on questions of law 
or jurisdiction. By contrast, a person affected by a decision of the BC Securities 
Commission may appeal to the BC Court of Appeal only with leave of a justice of that 
court.79 Sometimes, additional statutory criteria must also be met before leave will be 
granted.80 
                                               
76 For a discussion, see Canadian National Railway Company v. Emerson Milling Inc., 2017 FCA 79 
(CanLII), [2018] 2 FCR 573. 
77 Vavilov, supra note 27 at para 52. 
78 ibid. at para 37. 
79 Compare Forest and Range Practices Act, SBC 2002, c 69, s 140.7 with BC Securities Act, supra note 8, 
s 167. 
80 For example, an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal from judicial review by the Federal Court on 
immigration matters may be made only if the Federal Court judge certifies that “a serious question of 
general importance” is involved. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 62, s 74. 
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Is a Stay of Proceedings Automatic, or Do You Have to Apply for It? 
A stay of proceedings pauses the tribunal’s decision until the appeal is decided. The 
rules governing stays vary between jurisdictions and tribunals. Some enabling statutes 
empower their tribunals or appellate bodies (internal or court) to stay enforcement of the 
tribunal order pending appeal or other conditions.81 Others may not. Bodies created by 
statute, like tribunals and their internal appeal divisions, have no inherent jurisdiction to 
order a stay, so once again it matters what the enabling statute says on the matter.82 This 
is true of Federal Court, too, though stays of proceedings are provided for in its enabling 
statute.83 The omnibus statutes that operate in some provinces are also relevant: the 
Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act84 establishes a default rule that an appeal to the 
courts operates as a stay of a tribunal's proceedings.85 The BC ATA, by contrast, provides 
that commencing an appeal does not operate as a stay, unless the tribunal orders 
otherwise.86 Unless a statute specifically excludes it, as BC's ATA does, the court that is 
designated to take appeals from the tribunal has the inherent authority to grant a stay.87 
Like the legislative decision to permit appeals as of right or only with leave, a 
legislative decision to make a stay automatic or not may say something about how the 
legislature views the tribunals in question. Requiring potential appellants to apply for 
leave to appeal places an additional hurdle before them. Automatically staying a 
tribunal's decision holds its powers in abeyance while a court checks the tribunal's 
decision. Where the legislature decides that stays will not be automatic, the legislature 
may choose to allocate the power to order a stay either to the tribunal or to a court. These 
statutory drafting decisions reflect the legislature's comfort with granting broad autonomy 
to the tribunal and its determination of how best to balance rule-of-law with efficiency 
concerns as well as tribunal expertise with judicial oversight. 
Using the Courts: Judicial Review 
Judicial review has long been the main administrative law obsession. Tribunal-based 
and extralegal mechanisms and statutory appeals—not to mention the hugely important 
arena of administrative rulemaking discussed by Andrew Greene in Chapter 4—have 
been sidelined by comparison. In part this is because administrative law is often viewed 
through a prism of legal analyses created by judges, lawyers, and legal scholars. Legally 
trained people tend to be preoccupied with legal mechanisms and, in particular, with 
courts and the common law. This makes for an overly narrow lens. And yet, having 
placed judicial review in its broader context, it does deserve careful attention.  
Judicial review is fundamentally different from statutory or internal tribunal appeals 
because, at its root, judicial review is about the inherent jurisdiction of courts to oversee 
                                               
81 See e.g. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, s 69 et seq. 
82 See, e.g., S. W. v Canada Employment Insurance Commission and Health Canada, 2018 SST 672 at 
paras 12-22. 
83 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, ss 50, 50.1. 
84 Statutory Powers Procedure Act, supra note 43. 
85 Ibid, s 25. 
86 BC ATA, supra note 9su, s 25. 
87 Kooner v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2002), 213 DLR (4th) 707 (Ont Div Ct). 
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and check administrative (that is, executive) action, to safeguard the “rule of law” (for 
more on what the rule of law is, see Mary Liston in Chapter 4). This makes it a 
potentially sweeping remedy. Unlike appeals from tribunals, which the statute 
specifically permit, judicial review is the review of executive action beyond what the 
legislature provided for. For this reason, even if it happens fairly often these days, 
judicial review is still often referred to as an “extraordinary” remedy. 
Here are four things to know about judicial review. First, courts always and 
fundamentally retain the discretion to hear, or not to hear, an application for judicial 
review. Second, in addition to overcoming the discretionary nature of judicial review, an 
applicant will need to cross specific thresholds in order to be heard. Third, the historical 
development of the remedies available through judicial review has actively shaped, and 
limited, the possibilities and potential of judicial review itself. In spite of statutory reform 
and evolving case law, the ancient prerogative writs that were the original forms of 
judicial review continue to haunt its present forms. And finally, in response to the 
apparent disconnect between what some parties may want by way of remedies and what 
they can obtain on judicial review, some interesting private law and monetary damages-
oriented remedies have sprung up around the edges of judicial review. Each of these 
points is developed further below. 
Discretionary Bases for Refusing a Remedy 
A court's decision on whether to grant judicial review is intimately bound up with the 
core tension that underlies all of administrative law—what the Supreme Court has called 
"an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle, 
which finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create 
various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers."88  
Courts are the indispensable guardians of the rule of law, but they still need to operate 
within their sphere of authority. This means respecting the fact that, through enabling 
statutes, legislatures grant authority over certain things to administrative tribunals, and 
not to the courts. A lot of administrative law jurisprudence is devoted to trying to 
negotiate a path through the difficult territory on the borders of the branches' spheres of 
authority. What concerns us here is the threshold question of whether to grant judicial 
review at all—before considering the merits of the case, before figuring out the standard 
of review, and before determining the degree of procedural fairness a party is entitled to.  
Judicial review is fundamentally discretionary in a way that appeals are not. A court 
has the discretion to refuse to hear a matter or to grant a remedy, even where one seems 
clearly warranted on the facts.89 
 The original set of discretionary grounds for refusing relief derive from common 
law and equity, and they have survived the statutory reform of judicial review. They are 
                                               
88 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 27 [Dunsmuir]; affirmed in Vavilov, 
supra note 27 at para 2. 
89 Strickland v Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 2 SCR 713 [Strickland] at paras 37-45; ‘Namgis First 
Nation v Canada (Fisheries, Oceans and Coast Guard), 2020 FCA 122 at para 41.  
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similar to some of the equity-based grounds in civil procedure, such as laches 
(unreasonable delay), or unconscionability: 
1. The most important basis for refusing to grant a remedy in judicial review 
is discussed in more detail below: that adequate alternative remedies are 
available.90 Parties should exhaust all other legal avenues for review 
before proceeding to the "last resort" of judicial review. 
2. Judicial review applications that are brought before a tribunal has finished 
its proceedings are usually dismissed for being premature. This includes 
challenges to the tribunal's interim procedural and evidentiary rulings. The 
policy rationales that underlie dismissals for prematurity include: (a) that 
administrative action is meant to be more cost-effective than court 
proceedings, and interim judicial review fragments and prolongs those 
proceedings; (b) that preliminary complaints may become moot as the 
proceedings progress; and (c) that the court will be in a better position to 
assess the situation once a full and complete record of tribunal 
proceedings has been made.91 A judge on judicial review retains the 
discretion to hear an early application. However, the threshold is high.92 
To obtain judicial review of a tribunal's preliminary or interim ruling, an 
applicant must generally show exceptional circumstances, which would 
justify deviating from the usual rule. Evidence of irreparable harm, 
prejudice, costs, or the absence of an appropriate remedy at the end of the 
proceedings may constitute special or exceptional circumstances.93 The 
fact that a matter has taken an exceptionally long time to resolve can also 
encourage courts to find exceptional circumstances.94 Concerns that do not 
qualify as exceptional include those about procedural fairness or bias, 
jurisdictional issues, the presence of an important legal or constitutional 
issue, or the fact that all parties have consented to seeking judicial review 
early.95 
3. Even if statutory time limits for filing a judicial review application have 
been met, parties must be aware that delay and acquiescence may be 
grounds for a reviewing court to refuse a remedy.96 Parties should object 
promptly to any perceived impropriety on the part of the tribunal. 
                                               
90 See infra notes 122 to 125 [check referenced footnotes] and accompanying text. 
91 Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 
SCR 364; Sagkeeng v. Government of Manitoba et al., 2020 MBQB 83 at paras 39-41. 
92 Thielmann v The Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of the Province of Manitoba, 
2020 MBCA 8 [Thielmann] at paras 22-28. 
93 Ibid at paras 38-50. 
94 See, e.g., Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30 at paras 83-90; Peters First Nation Band Council v Peters, 
2019 FCA 197 at paras 35-42. 
95 Thielmann, supra note 92; Canada (Border Services Agency) v CB Powell Limited, 2010 FCA 61, [2011] 
2 FCR 332, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2011 SCCA No 267, at para 33. 
96 Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v. Lafontaine (Village), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 326 [Immeubles Port Louis]; 
2122157 Ontario Inc v Tarion Warranty Corporation, 2016 ONSC 851 (Div Ct). 
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Similarly, failing to attend a tribunal hearing could waive any right to 
judicial review, since it seems to suggest that the party is acquiescing. 
4. A remedy in judicial review will not be granted where the issues are moot. 
This may be the case where a dispute is over or has not yet arisen, where a 
tribunal's order has expired or no longer affects the applicant, or where the 
litigant no longer actually wants the remedy that the tribunal might have 
granted had it not erred.97 But note that mootness concerns can be more 
easily overcome in applications for habeas corpus, discussed below.98 
5. The court will use its discretion to refuse to grant a remedy on judicial 
review where the party making the judicial review application does not 
come with clean hands. This could include seeking a remedy to facilitate 
illegal conduct or to obtain an unfair advantage, or flouting the law or 
making misrepresentations.99 
By the 1990s, these long-standing grounds for refusing relief came to be overlaid 
with a different vision of judicial review that reflected a new sensitivity to separation of 
powers issues, and increased deference toward administrative tribunals. The overarching 
presumption of judicial deference toward administrative decision-making percolated 
throughout the judicial review process, eventually reaching the discretionary grounds for 
granting relief in the first place. In other words, even where the five original grounds 
above were not present, courts began to recognize that it could sometimes be appropriate 
to refuse to grant judicial review out of deference to tribunals' unique institutional roles. 
Perhaps the most forceful statement from this era comes from Domtar Inc. v Quebec.100 
In deciding not to intervene to resolve a conflict in legal interpretation between two 
tribunals construing the same statutory language, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, 
"[t]he advisability of judicial intervention in the event of conflicting decisions among 
administrative tribunals, even when serious and unquestionable, cannot, in these 
circumstances, be determined solely by the 'triumph' of the rule of law."101 The court 
went on to articulate what was then a novel, and striking, notion: that even the most 
deeply cherished rule-of-law values will not always point the way to the only, or perhaps 
even the most appropriate, response to a problem in administrative law, because 
administrative tribunals’ independence and autonomy must also be taken into account. 
Sometimes, the rule of law must be “qualified”.102 
                                               
97 Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 342 at 353; but see Mission Institution v Khela, 
2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 SCR 502 [Khela] at paras 13-14; Attawapiskat First Nation v Canada, 2012 FC 948 
[Attawapiskat First Nation] at paras 41-48. 
98 Khela, ibid., at paras 13-14; Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina, 2019 SCC 
29 at para 15. 
99 See e.g. DeJesus v. Sharif, 2010 BCCA 121, paras 83-86. Courts may still exercise their discretion to 
grant judicial review even if an applicant does not come with clean hands: Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration) v Thanabalasingham, 2006 FCA 14, 263 DLR (4th) 51. 
100 Domtar Inc v Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles),  [1993] 2 SCR 756. 
101 Ibid at 795. 
102 Ibid at 799-800; see also Beverley McLachlin, “The Roles of Administrative Tribunals and Courts in 
Maintaining the Rule of Law” (1998-1999) 12 CJALP 171-89 at 175. This article is also an early statement 
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 In this way, courts moved past the restrictive traditional grounds for refusing to 
exercise discretion to grant judicial review. But the fact that judicial review is 
discretionary does not mean that courts are entitled to introduce some poorly-defined, 
deferential "X factor" into the decision-making process. Respecting, protecting, and 
adhering to the rule of law means that judges must base even discretionary decisions on 
identifiable reasons. Reason-giving is essential to ensuring that a “culture of justification” 
exists, not only for tribunals but for courts too.103 
Over the last ten years or so, the Supreme Court of Canada has tried to both 
clarify and limit the grounds on which a court can exercise its discretion not to hear a 
matter on judicial review. While the factors to be considered still “cannot be reduced to a 
checklist or a statement of general rules,”104 there is guidance to be had. In Khosa, the 
court stated that the discretion to grant or withhold judicial review “must be exercised 
judicially and in accordance with proper principles."105 In setting out those proper 
principles, the court identified the standard of review principles that govern 
administrative law generally, and which are discussed in other chapters of this book, plus 
the traditional grounds as identified and described above: “other factors such as an 
applicant's delay, failure to exhaust adequate alternate remedies, mootness, prematurity, 
bad faith and so forth.”106 In MiningWatch (per coram with Rothstein J writing), the court 
added another consideration (and one that has been rising in salience since Khosa), 
namely the balance of convenience to the various parties.107 In an interesting 
juxtaposition to the Domtar language, which back in 1993 had proposed that the rule of 
law must sometimes be qualified, MiningWatch observes that, because the discretionary 
power to refuse judicial review “may make inroads upon the rule of law, it must be 
exercised with the greatest care.”108  
Is Judicial Review Available? Threshold Eligibility Questions 
Convincing a court to exercise its discretion to hear a matter on judicial review is not 
all it takes to get heard on judicial review. The unique history, purpose, and mechanics of 
judicial review also mean that it will not be available in all situations. There are five main 
threshold questions that an applicant must cross in order to be eligible. 
One of the key threshold questions is whether the tribunal whose actions are being 
challenged is, in fact, a public body. Judicial review is available to check executive 
action. Therefore, only public bodies can be subject to judicial review. While this may 
sound straightforward enough, some organizations in Canadian society operate in a grey 
                                               
of the Chief Justice’s concept of the “ethos of justification” that underlies the rule of law, and which 
continues to be a vital part of contemporary jurisprudence. 
103 Vavilov, supra note 27 at paras 2, 14. 
104 Strickland, supra note 89 at para 45 (in considering whether adequate alternative remedies had been 
exhausted). 
105 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa] at para 40. 
106 Ibid at para 51. 
107 MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 SCR 6 at para 52 
[MiningWatch]; see also Khosa, supra note 105at paras 36, 133-35. 
108 MiningWatch, supra note 153 at para 52. 
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zone, removed from pure government functions even while exercising some meaningful 
"public" powers. Others organizations may seem private, but have some connection to 
public authority. For example, stock exchanges regulate their members’ conduct, 
including issuing and revoking licences, in order to protect the public. However, their 
authority to act as they do derives from a centuries-old compact with their members, not 
from any statutory grant of authority. How much does that matter? Similarly, we can 
distinguish between government-acting-as-state, and government-acting-as-private-
contracting-party. A private party will generally have trouble obtaining judicial review of 
a government board's decision not to award it a particular contract.109 As well, public 
employees with employment contracts will generally have their employment 
relationships governed by private (contract) law, not public (administrative) law.110  
Various factors go into determining whether a particular tribunal is a private body or 
a public one. No one factor is determinative. Relevant considerations include whether the 
matter at issue is of a more public or more private character; the nature of the decision-
maker and the nature of its relationships to a statutory scheme or to government action; 
whether the decision being challenged was authorized by a public source of law; and 
whether public law remedies would be “suitable.”111 
In addition to determining whether a tribunal is a sufficiently “public” body, a party 
seeking to challenge administrative action should determine whether they have standing 
to challenge a tribunal decision. The answer will be straightforward for individuals who 
are actual parties to an administrative action, but other persons may have a collateral 
interest in the same matter and may want to challenge a tribunal order that does not 
directly affect them.112 There is also discretionary “public interest standing,” under which 
an individual or group may be able to challenge administrative action on behalf of 
others.113 Since tribunals are expected to maintain their impartiality, courts will also 
exercise their discretion in deciding whether and to what degree a tribunal should be able 
to participate on its own behalf, when a party challenges its administrative action.114  
Third, a party seeking to challenge administrative action should determine to which 
court they should apply for judicial review. Both the provincial superior courts and the 
federal courts have judicial review jurisdiction. Although a tribunal's enabling statute will 
generally set out which court has jurisdiction to hear a statutory appeal to the courts, this 
                                               
109 But consider the improper purpose doctrine: Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 
SCR 231. 
110 Dunsmuir, supra note 88 at paras 79-83, 112-17 (still good law on this point); also Makis v Alberta 
Health Services, 2020 ABCA 168 at para 48; Democracy Watch v Ontario Integrity Commissioner, 2020 
ONSC 6081. 
111 Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347 at para 60; see also McDonald v Anishinabek 
Police Service (2006), 83 OR (3d) 132 (Div Ct); Setia v Appleby College, 2013 ONCA 753. 
112 See e.g. Globalive Wireless Management Corp v Public Mobile Inc, 2011 FCA 194, leave to appeal to 
SCC refused, [2011] SCCA No 349. 
113 See Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 
2012 SCC 45, para 37. 
114 Ontario (Energy Board) v Ontario Power Generation Inc, 2015 SCC 414, [2015] 3 SCR 147, paras 52-
59; but see The Owners, Strata Plan NW 2575 v Booth, 2020 BCCA 153 at para 22. 
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is not the case for judicial review. (This makes sense, because judicial review is an 
extraordinary remedy that the enabling statute does not provide for in the first place.) 
Typically, which court to go to is determined by which level of government –  provincial 
or federal – created the tribunal.115 Ontario's Judicial Review Procedure Act also sets out 
which superior court (Divisional or Superior Court) receives judicial review applications 
from the different provincial tribunals.116 
Fourth, a party should ensure that they have not missed any deadlines. Some statutes 
impose time limits for filing an application for judicial review. For example, the Federal 
Courts Act states that a judicial review application from a federal tribunal to the Federal 
Court must be made within 30 days of the time the underlying decision or order is first 
communicated.117 In Alberta, the rules impose a six-month time limit on all applications 
for judicial review, except habeas corpus applications.118 Nova Scotia precludes all 
applications for judicial review after the earlier of six months following the decision, or 
25 days after the decision is communicated to the person.119 In British Columbia, the 
general time limit is 60 days.120 Parties should therefore check all applicable statutes, 
including the tribunal's enabling statutes, global procedural and judicial review acts, and 
rules of court, for time limits affecting judicial review. However, courts often have the 
authority, under statute, to extend the time periodf for bringing a judicial review 
application—for example, where there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, where 
the extension would not cause substantial prejudice or hardship, and/or where the party 
can demonstrate prima facie grounds for relief.121 
The final threshold eligibility matter that a party must establish before gaining access 
to judicial review is that they have exhausted all other adequate means of recourse for 
challenging the tribunal's actions.122 Depending on the tribunal's enabling statute, other 
means of recourse may include almost any of the legal remedies above: reconsideration 
by the same tribunal, appeals to internal appellate tribunals and other intra-agency 
mechanisms such as grievance arbitration, and appeals to a court. However, not all other 
                                               
115 There are some exceptions. For example, provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction where 
Charter issues are raised in attacks on federal legislative regimes (Reza v Canada, [1994] 2 SCR 394) 
and—although this is private law, not judicial review—over damages actions in which relief is sought 
against the federal Crown (Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc, 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 SCR 585 
[TeleZone]). On the Crown prerogative see also Hupacasath First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada), 2015 FCA 4, and on concurrent jurisdiction more generally, see also 
Strickland, supra note 89 at paras 16-33. 
116 See, e.g., Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA), RSO 1990, c J 1, s 6. 
117 Federal Courts Act, supra note 83, s 18.1(2). The deadline can be extended: see, e.g. Canada (Attorney 
General) v Larkman, 2012 FCA 204. 
118 Rule 3.15(2) of the Alberta Rules of Court (Alta Reg 124/2010). 
119 Rule 7.05(1), Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, Royal Gaz Nov 19, 2008, imposes the time limit on 
applications for relief in the nature of certiorari. 
120 BC ATA, supra note 9, s 57(1). The ATA does not apply to all tribunals in BC. 
121 E.g. Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act, supra note 164, s 5; BC ATA, supra note 9, s 57(2). The 
Federal Courts Act, supra note 83, does not set out the conditions that must be met in order for the court to 
grant an extension of time: s 18.1(2). 
122 Harelkin v University of Regina, [1979] 2 SCR 561, 96 DLR (3d) 14 [Harelkin]. 
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means of recourse will necessarily be “adequate”. In determining whether other means of 
recourse are actually adequate, courts will consider “the convenience of the alternative 
remedy; the nature of the error alleged; the nature of the other forum which could deal 
with the issue, including its remedial capacity; the existence of adequate and effective 
recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place; expeditiousness; the 
relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; economical use of judicial resources; 
and cost.”123 These categories are not closed. In balancing these factors, a court should 
engage in a broad inquiry that considers not only whether some other remedy is adequate 
but whether—taking into account the purposes and policy considerations underpinning 
the legislative scheme, the balance of convenience to the parties, and other factors the 
court may consider relevant—granting judicial review in the circumstances would be 
appropriate.124 
 In determining whether an internal administrative appeal counts as an adequate 
alternative remedy, applicants must do more than just raise unproven allegations that the 
appellate tribunal will suffer from the same errors125 or biases126 as the original tribunal. 
Nor can challengers circumvent available appeals on the grounds both parties consent to 
doing so.127 
Parliament and several provinces have also legislated in this area. For example, 
the Federal Courts Act prohibits judicial review by the Federal Court where an available 
appeal of a tribunal's decision to the Federal Court exists.128 Quebec's Code of Civil 
Procedure also prohibits a superior court from applying Quebec's version of certiorari to 
a tribunal decision where an appeal is available. On the other hand, Ontario's Judicial 
Review Procedure Act and Prince Edward Island's Judicial Review Act both permit 
judicial review notwithstanding any other right of appeal to the courts.129 Of course, the 
fact that a court may grant judicial review, even where a right of appeal exists, does not 
mean that it will do so. As we might expect, courts are reluctant to do so.130 
Remedies on Judicial Review 
The remedies available on judicial review have their roots in the ancient prerogative 
writs, discussed further below. Over time, those became unwieldy. In many provinces, 
they were modified by statute to deal with the fact that they had become progressively 
more technical and more unreasonably narrow. In spite of this, it is still necessary to 
                                               
123 Strickland, supra note 89 at para 42. 
124 Ibid at paras 43-44. 
125 Harelkin, supra note 170. 
126 Turnbull v Canadian Institute of Actuaries (1995), 129 DLR (4th) 42 (Man CA). 
127 Canada (Border Services Agency) v CB Powell Limited, supra note 95 at para 33.  
128 Federal Courts Act, supra note 83, s 18.5. For a more extensive discussion of access to judicial review 
in the Federal Court, see Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 
FCA 250. 
129 See, respectively, Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 46, s 529; Judicial Review Procedure Act, supra 
note 164, s 2(1); and Judicial Review Act (PEI JRA), RSPEI 1988, c J-3, s 4(2). 
130 See, e.g. Volochay v College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 541 at para 70; Anne & 
Gilbert Inc v Government of PEI, 2012 PECA 4. 
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understand the ancient writs to understand the scope and range of remedies available on 
judicial review. For example, neither the old writs nor the reform statutes, which are 
based on the old writs, allow a court on judicial review to substitute its views, on the 
substance of a matter, for the tribunal's views. The old writs also continue to operate in 
some provinces, albeit in a more limited way.131 
A party contemplating judicial review should also be aware that, unlike an appeal, an 
application for judicial review usually does not automatically stay the enforcement of the 
underlying tribunal order, although the tribunal or the court or both may have the power 
to stay the tribunal's order on application.132 The legislative decision to make stays 
automatic for many appeals but not for judicial review applications is consistent with the 
"last resort" nature of judicial review. The rules regarding stays vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and from tribunal to tribunal, so parties seeking a stay should be sure to 
review the relevant enabling statute, as well as the rules of court and any omnibus statutes 
governing procedure or judicial review. 
The following sections introduce the prerogative writs and subsequent statutory 
reform. Because judicial review remains fundamentally discretionary, we also discuss the 
bases on which courts have refused to grant a remedy. 
Introduction to the Prerogative Writs 
Certiorari is the most commonly used prerogative remedy, both historically and 
today. Certiorari ("cause to be certified") is a special proceeding by which a superior 
court requires some inferior tribunal, board, or judicial officer to provide it with the 
record of its proceedings for review for excess of jurisdiction. It was the established 
method by which the Court of King's Bench in England, from earliest times, checked the 
jurisdiction of lower courts and maintained the supremacy of the royal courts. In the 
United States, the vast majority of applications to the US Supreme Court are still made by 
way of a petition for certiorari. A successful certiorari application results in the 
"quashing" (effectively, the invalidating) of a tribunal's order or decision. It is an ex post 
facto remedy. Note that generally, the court cannot substitute its decision for the decision 
of a tribunal that the court finds had erred, because the court does not have the tribunal’s 
statutory decision-making authority.133 Quashing the existing decision effectively means 
that the matter is remitted to the administrative decision-maker, who still retains the 
statutory jurisdiction to decide.  
                                               
131 For example, the "direct action in nullity" continues to operate in Quebec: Immeubles Port Louis, supra 
note 139. In New Brunswick, judicial review exists alongside a range of "alternative" remedies echoing the 
old prerogative writs. See e.g. Sullivan v Greater Moncton Planning District Commission (1993), 132 NBR 
(2d) 285 (TD). Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench Rules, Man Reg 553/88, Rule 68.01 states only that "[a] 
Judge on application may grant an order of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or quo warranto." Yukon 
Territory has not enacted any statutory changes to the writs. 
132 See e.g. Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act, supra note 43, s 25; New Brunswick Energy and 
Utilities Board Act, SNB 2006, c E-9.18, s 52(2). 
133 Even before Vavilov, in exceptional circumstances, courts have sometimes ordered the decision that they 
find the original tribunal ought to have made. See e.g. Renaud v Québec (Commission des affaires 
sociales), [1999] 3 SCR 855, 184 DLR (4th) 441, [1999] SCJ No 70 ; Corp of the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Assn v Ontario (Civilian Commission on Police Services) (2002), 61 OR (3d) 649 (CA); Allman v Amacon 
Property Management Services Inc, [2007] BCJ No 1144  (CA). 
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The related writ of prohibition is another special proceeding, issued by an 
appellate court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction, or to prevent a 
non-judicial officer or entity from exercising a power. Prohibition is a kind of common 
law injunction to prevent an unlawful assumption of jurisdiction. Unlike certiorari, 
which provides relief after a decision is made, prohibition is used to obtain relief pre-
emptively. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or person exercising judicial 
functions in a manner or by means not within its jurisdiction or discretion. 
Mandamus (literally, "we command") is a writ issued by a superior court to 
compel a lower court or a government agency to perform a duty it is mandated to 
perform. It can be combined with an application for certiorari. Certiorari would be used 
to quash a decision—for example, for a lack of procedural fairness—while mandamus 
would be used to remit the matter to the tribunal, to reconsider in a procedurally fair 
manner. A variation on mandamus gives the court the discretion to remit a matter back to 
a tribunal for reconsideration, with directions. Superior courts have the inherent power to 
order reconsideration with directions, and several provincial statutes and rules of court, as 
well as the Federal Courts Act,134 also grant this power.  
The 2019 Vavilov decision made some substantial changes to judicial review 
applications based on mandamus. As noted, the ancient prerogative writ of mandamus 
permitted courts to remit a matter back to a decision maker, but did not permit the court 
to give directions to that decision maker. The variant, mandamus 2.0, recognized that a 
court could exercise its discretion to remit a matter back to a tribunal with directions. 
However, the court could not tell the tribunal how it must decide. In particular, even 
mandamus 2.0 could not be used to force an administrative decision-maker to exercise its 
discretion in a particular way, although exercises of discretion could not be unlawful and 
must always conform to the constitution. This notion took on a life of its own over the 
last decade, as courts began to reflect on the idea that sometimes, there could only be one 
lawful way in which the decision maker’s discretion could be exercised, and that courts 
should avoid excessive delay on the way to reaching that one right answer.135 Vavilov has 
confirmed this trend.136 It tells us that it will most often be appropriate for the court to 
remit the matter, with reasons. However, the court can also decline to remit a matter to 
the tribunal altogether, “where it becomes evident to the court … that a particular 
outcome is inevitable and that remitting the case would therefore serve no useful 
purpose”.137 In determining whether to remit a matter to a tribunal, a court on judicial 
review should consider “[e]lements like concern for delay, fairness to the parties, urgency 
                                               
134 Federal Courts Act, supra note 83. 
135 In the so-called Insite case, which concerned a safe drug injection site, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that BC’s Minister of Health had not exercised its discretion consistent with the Charter when it 
refused to exempt Insite from certain criminal law provisions. The court then took the rare step of issuing 
an order in the nature of mandamus, compelling the Minister to exercise its discretion so as to issue an 
exemption to Insite. Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 
3 SCR 134, para 150. See also Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v LeBon, 2013 FCA 
55; D’Errico v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 95 at paras 16-18. 
136 See Paul Daly, chapter XX at ? 
137 Vavilov, supra note 27 at para 142.  
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of providing a resolution to the dispute, the nature of the particular regulatory regime, 
whether the administrative decision maker had a genuine opportunity to weigh in on the 
issue in question, costs to the parties, and the efficient use of public resources”.138 
A declaration is a judgment of a court that determines and states the legal position 
of the parties, or the law that applies to them. There are two kinds of declarations: the 
public law kind, used to declare some government action ultra vires, and the private law 
kind, used to clarify the law or declare a private party's rights under a statute. The public 
law kind is the main concern of administrative law. Declarations are not enforceable, and 
they cannot require anyone to take or refrain from taking any action. Historically, this 
made declarations useful in actions against the Crown itself because the traditional 
common law position was that relief in the nature of mandamus was not available against 
the Crown. It was not thought appropriate for a court to order enforcement against the 
Crown, because the Crown was the source of its own authority. The non-coercive nature 
of the remedy has not often proven to be a problem, because court declarations against 
government bodies in particular tend to be respected.139 Where a declaration does not 
produce a government response, however, the declaration may look like a distinctly 
second-rate remedy.140 At least where the Crown prerogative over foreign affairs is 
concerned, an aggrieved party may find themselves having a right without a remedy—or, 
more accurately, having a right for which a meaningful remedy exists only in the 
political, and not the legal, arena. 
Habeas corpus (literally, "produce the body") is a writ employed to bring a person 
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is 
not illegal. Like certiorari, habeas corpus continues to live an active life in the United 
States, where it is the primary mechanism for challenging state-level death penalty 
sentences in the federal courts. In Canada, most habeas corpus applications are brought 
by people detained in correctional, immigration, and mental health institutions or 
detained by police, child welfare authorities, or other state actors. Unlike the other 
prerogative writs, habeas corpus is not inherently discretionary. It issues “as of right if 
the applicant proves a deprivation of liberty and raises a legitimate ground upon which to 
question the legality of the deprivation.”141 Moreover, habeas is available regardless of 
what other remedies a statutory scheme provides for, unless the administrative regime in 
question is “a complete, comprehensive and expert scheme which provides review that is 
at least as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus with respect to the grounds raised by 
                                               
138 Ibid. 
139 See, e.g., Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (issuing a declaration that the RCMP 
pension plan violated job-sharers’ Charter s. 15 rights, apparently confident that Canada would take the 
necessary steps to address the discriminatory effect). 
140 Khadr, supra note 66. In 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada determined that Omar Khadr had been 
deprived of his s 7 Charter rights and issued a declaration to that effect, leaving it to the government to 
decide how best to respond. The government did not seek Mr. Khadr's repatriation as he had sought. 
141 Khela, supra note 97 at para 41. 
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the applicant”.142 In the Supreme Court’s words, habeas “remains as fundamental to our 
modern conception of liberty as it was in the days of King John”.143  
Quo warranto ("by what warrant?" or "by what authority?") is a writ used to 
inquire into what authority existed to justify acts by or powers claimed by a public office. 
It is rarely used today, and some provinces have abolished it by statute.144  
 Statutory Reform 
Over time, each of the prerogative writs above came to be bound up in technical 
complexity and arcane rules. Potentially meritorious applications were dismissed because 
the applicant had petitioned for the wrong writ, or because the claim was barred by some 
technical limitation. As the case law became more complex and the practical injustices 
more obvious, policy reasons for maintaining the distinction between the various writs 
eroded. 
The result, in many provinces and at the Federal Court,145 was statutory reform. 
Some provinces enacted omnibus statutes governing judicial review or statutory/civil 
procedure,146 while others used their rules of court to enact changes.147 Only Yukon 
Territory seems to have left the common law untouched. The details vary from one 
statutory scheme to another, but key statutes that may apply are the Federal Courts Act, 
the Ontario and BC Judicial Review Procedure Acts (JRPAs), the Ontario Statutory 
Powers Procedure Act, the BC Administrative Tribunals Act, the PEI Judicial Review 
Act, Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure, and the rules of court in other provinces and 
territories. These important statutes have sought to clarify judicial review procedure. 
Some have also tried to change the substantive shape of judicial review itself. Therefore, 
parties considering challenging a tribunal order must be aware of the relevant statutes' 
provisions, as well as those of the tribunal's own enabling statutes. Statutory reforms 
commonly provide for the following: 
                                               
142 Chhina, supra note 98 at para 71; see also Brown v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FCA 
130 in relation to the Federal Courts Act. 
143 Chhina, ibid. 
144 E.g. PEI JRA, supra note 129, s 11; BC Judicial Review Procedure Act (BCJRPA), RSBC 1996, c 241, 
s 18 (certain remedies in the nature of quo warranto still available). 
145 Federal Courts Act, supra note 83, s 18(1) provides the Federal Court exclusive original jurisdiction "to 
issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, or writ of quo warranto, or 
grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal." Note that habeas corpus 
is not included in the list. Jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus in, e.g. federal penitentiaries, which are 
otherwise subject to Federal Court review, remains with the provincial superior courts: Khela, supra note 
97 at paras 31-35. 
146 Ontario JRPA, supra note 164, BCJRPA, supra note 144, PEI JRA, supra note 129, Quebec Code of 
Civil Procedure, supra note 46. Ontario and BC have enacted the most comprehensive reforms. Be aware 
that, apart from habeas corpus, terminology in Quebec is different. For example, prohibition and certiorari 
are codified under "evocation" and "revision" in s 846 of the Civil Code. Remedies equivalent to quo 
warranto and mandamus are codified under ss 838 and 844ff, respectively, and the terms "quo warranto" 
and "mandamus" are used in practice, but they do not appear in the Code. There also exists the "declaratory 
judgment in motion," codified at s 453, which allows a party to have their rights "declared." 
147 Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, and 
Saskatchewan. 
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1. Simplified application procedures. For example, a statute may state that 
applications for orders "in the nature of" mandamus, prohibition, or 
certiorari shall be deemed to be applications for judicial review, to be 
brought by way of an originating notice or petition. The new judicial 
review application combines most of the old writs. In bringing a petition 
for judicial review, the party only has to set out the grounds on which 
relief is sought and the nature of the relief sought, without having to 
specify under which particular writ they might have proceeded at common 
law. 
2. Simplified remedies including, for example, the power to set aside a 
decision or direct the tribunal to reconsider its decision, with or without 
directions. Some statutes also expressly give courts the authority to ignore 
technical irregularities or defects in form if the court finds no substantial 
wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred. 
3. Greater clarity as to who may be parties to a hearing—for example, 
decision-makers whose exercise of statutory authority is being questioned. 
Generally, judicial review statutes also provide that notice must be given 
to the Attorney General, who is entitled as of right to be heard on the 
application. 
4. A right of appeal. Judicial review applications are generally made to the 
superior courts of the provinces, and the statutes provide for a subsequent 
right of appeal to the provincial Court of Appeal. Federal Court decisions 
would be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. 
5. Judicial review mechanisms to challenge interlocutory orders and to 
resolve interim issues. At common law, certiorari was only available with 
respect to "decisions"—that is, final orders. However, the BC and Ontario 
JRPAs use the words "exercise of statutory power," rather than the word 
"decision," which expands the range of judicial review to include any 
exercise of statutory power.148 Other statutes permit a tribunal to refer a 
"stated case" to the courts to determine a question of law, after which the 
case can go back to the original tribunal for determination of the ultimate 
issues.149 For example, BC tribunals that do not have jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions under the ATA can issue a stay and refer a 
constitutional question to a court of competent jurisdiction.150  
Private Law Remedies 
As noted above, a tribunal’s enabling statute may give it the power to order a range of 
remedies, including money damages. Courts on judicial review do not have the same 
ability. The difficulty is that neither the old prerogative writs, nor the new statutory 
remedy of judicial review, allow a party to obtain monetary relief through judicial 
                                               
148 BCJRPA, supra note 144, s 3; Ontario JRPA, supra note 164, s 2. 
149 E.g. Federal Courts Act, supra note 83, s 18.3; BC ATA, supra note 9, s 43. 
150 BC ATA, ibid, ss 44, 45. 
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review. In some circumstances, what the unhappy parties probably really want are 
monetary damages. They are not easy to obtain. 
Public bodies, like administrative agencies, can be subject to purely private law 
remedies outside the scope of administrative action and judicial review. The Crown and 
its servants can be liable to private parties for monetary relief, although some statutes 
limit individual administrative tribunal members' liability.151 However, to seek monetary 
relief, an aggrieved party must initiate a separate civil action for restitution or damages 
alongside, or instead of, a judicial review application.  
Government agencies may be sued, for example, for breach of contract or for the tort 
of negligence. However, a public officer must be able to make decisions that are adverse 
to some peoples’ interests, in the service of broader public policy goals. One cannot sue 
when it comes to the effects of government decisions around “core policy matters”.152 
The government can also raise the legality of a tribunal’s decision as a defence to a 
damages claim.153 The tort of negligence, which is grounded in proximity and the 
question of what one owes to one’s neighbour, is a poor fit when considering the 
relationship between citizens and the state.154 Alexander Pless discusses these private law 
suits, as well as the relationship and potential overlap between private rights of action and 
judicial review applications, further in Chapter 21. 
As another alternative, government agencies may be sued for the special tort of 
misfeasance in (or abuse of) public office. This would be a potential source of money 
damages against public actors acting in their public capacity. The threshold is high, 
however. To succeed in an action for tort of misfeasance in public office, the plaintiff 
must establish, in addition to the basic elements of negligence, (1) deliberate and 
unlawful conduct by someone in public office, and (2) the public officer's subjective 
knowledge that the conduct was unlawful and likely to harm the plaintiff. Because this 
tort alleges bad faith on the part of a public official, "clear proof commensurate with the 
seriousness of the wrong" is required.155 The public officer must “deliberately engage in 
conduct that [they know] to be inconsistent with the obligations of the office.”156 
The leading case on the tort of misfeasance in public office, Odhavji, involved an 
action for damages against police officers and the chief of the Metropolitan Toronto 
Police by the estate of an individual shot by the police. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
police officers involved in the shooting did not promptly or fully comply with their 
statutory duty to cooperate with an ensuing investigation, and that the chief of police did 
not adequately compel cooperation. The case made its way to the Supreme Court of 
                                               
151 E.g. BC ATA, supra note 9, s 56. 
152 R v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 SCR 45 [Imperial Tobacco] at para 90. 
153 TeleZone, supra note 115 at para 46. The precise role of legality or illegality in an action for damages is 
a little more complicated in practice than this, and is explored in more detail in Chapter xx. 
154 Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada, 2015 FCA 89, leave to appeal refused, [2015] SCCA No 227 at paras 
119-130. 
155 Powder Mountain Resorts Ltd v British Columbia, 2001 BCCA 619 at para 8.  
156 Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263 at para 28. See also Clark v Ontario 
(Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 311 at paras 97-114; Rain Coast Water Corp. v British Columbia, 2019 
BCCA 201 at paras 150-156. 
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Canada on the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim. It was determined that 
the plaintiff had made out a cause of action and that the matter should be allowed to 
proceed; thus confirming that the tort of misfeasance in public office exists. Subsequent 
cases have considered the tort of misfeasance in public office against a range of public 
actors including provincial and federal departments or ministries, federal penitentiary 
staff, hospital boards, and racing commissions. 
As these cases make clear, some of these kinds of torts will overlap with a potential 
judicial review application while others will not. Judicial review is not an option in a case 
like Odhavji, because there was no administrative decision to challenge. It was about 
police action. In other cases, like one involving Health Canada’s handling of a drug 
approval application, or a hospital board’s revocation of a doctor’s privileges, an 
administrative actor’s conduct may be precisely what is being challenged. As always in 
this field, an unhappy party needs to understand what it wants, and what routes might be 




Administrative law remedies are the product of history, and of democratic and rule-
of-law priorities, often acting in tension with each other. These tensions are emblematic 
of a fundamental contest between deeply held values around the rule of law on the one 
hand, and administrative expertise, legal pluralism, and democratic accountability on the 
other.  
Tribunals develop remedies that are novel, by court standards, because administrative 
agencies are differently constituted than courts are. Regardless of how we may feel about 
any particular decision, we should not lose sight of the exciting fact that administrative 
tribunals are unique, specialized, purpose-built and sometimes innovative structures with 
focused mandates. They will be at the front line of justice, when it comes to trying to 
address the public health, social, equity, and economic challenges that face us in this third 
decade of the third millennium. 
Administrative law remedies at the court level, especially on judicial review, have 
also been shaped by their historical origins and by subsequent, sometimes piecemeal, 
reform efforts. Judicial review and court-centred processes, which fill up the majority of 
most textbooks, are still just one, final stage of administrative law and practice. We need 
court oversight, to safeguard the rule of law and to ensure that our governments remain 
democratic and accountable. All the same, lawyers’ usual focus on courts and legal 
reasoning should not limit our appreciation of, and approach to, the complex and varied 
forms that front-line administrative action can represent. 
At both levels, parties may not obtain, or to hold onto, the remedies that they want the 
most. If we were to design a set of remedies from scratch today, we would probably not 
decide to set up two separate mechanisms for accessing the courts (that is, statutory 
appeals and judicial review). We might create an overarching administrative 
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supertribunal to hear both appeals and judicial review applications.157 Perhaps there was 
also some decision point at which we could have developed a public law remedy for 
monetary damages, where those seem to be the most appropriate remedies. Yet without 
genuinely sweeping reform, administrative law remedies will continue to be influenced 
by their historical roots as well as by the bold remedial moves that tribunals make, and all 
of these remedies in turn will continue to drive administrative law forward. Even as they 
evolve, these remedies will continue to be informed by the particular history, and the 
promise, that define this unique legal universe. 
 
  
                                               
157 Quebec has one: see the Act respecting administrative justice, CQLR c J-3, Which created the 
Administrative Tribunal of Quebec. 
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